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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS POLITICAL SPOILS 
William P. Marshall* 
INTRODUCTION 
Senator Schumer notwithstanding,1 the source of our recent 
judicial appointments woes may actually be Erie v. Tompkins.2  In Erie, 
the Supreme Court formally subscribed to the position, associated with 
the Legal Realists, that law could not be understood as stemming from 
an objective, transcendental source.3  Rather, law was to be recognized 
as the product of judges empowered to decide legal questions.4  
American law has yet to recover from this decision and its impact on the 
judicial appointments process has only begun to be realized. 
In Erie, Justice Louis D. Brandeis applied the legal realist 
understanding of law to a relatively narrow issue—whose common law, 
federal or state, must a federal court apply as its rule of decision in 
common law cases?  But the legal realist notion that law is not objective 
could be quickly understood as applicable to questions of constitutional, 
as well as common, law.  Thus, at roughly the same historical moment 
as the Court decided Erie, President Franklin Roosevelt was busy 
appointing Justices to the Supreme Court he believed would uphold his 
New Deal legislation.5 
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.  I am very grateful to Winston
Bowman for his excellent research assistance. 
 1 In June 2001, Senator Charles Schumer, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
suggested that the Senate should review the ideology of judicial nominees during the 
confirmation process.  See Charles E. Schumer, Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, 
at A19.  Schumer’s position has triggered substantial debate and criticism.  See, e.g., Ronald D. 
Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming Federal Court Judges, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
127 (2001); John S. Baker Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 177 (2001). 
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
3 Id. at 79. 
4 In Erie the Court abandoned a century old precedent allowing federal courts the power to 
fashion rules of common law, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), in favor of a mandate 
that federal courts must defer to the common law decisions of state courts.  If, as the Realists 
argued, omnipresent principles of common law did not exist, then allowing federal courts to 
fashion the rules of decision in common law cases would, in effect, be no less than the 
authorizing of a federal power grab.  Accordingly, allowing the federal courts to create common 
law rules of decision violated constitutional limits on federal power. 
5 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 158-62 (2002). 
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Nevertheless, while those in earlier times may have appreciated the 
insights of the realist critique, few surrendered entirely to a subjective 
view of the law.  Rather, in previous eras, the belief that there was some 
sort of an objective “there” there in the determination of constitutional 
meaning continued to persist despite the realist challenge.6  On this 
basis then, Hebert Wechsler could lead a search for neutral principles of 
law during the 1950s and 1960s,7 while presidents of both parties 
selected judicial nominees based more on concerns of geographical, 
religious, and ethnic diversity than on ideological purity.8 
Things have changed.  For a number of reasons, the view that the 
identities of judges are inextricably related to the results they will reach 
in constitutional law cases has achieved an unprecedented dominance in 
the contemporary political and legal landscape.9  Not surprisingly, the 
ascendance of this view has had dramatic implications for the judicial 
nominations process.  In a world where law is seen as driven by the 
individual ideologies of particular judges, the power to choose who is 
elevated to the bench becomes the power, in effect, to decide 
constitutional questions.  As a result, the nominations process has 
become the flashpoint in the struggle over constitutional meaning.  The 
result of all this is that now, more than any time in our Nation’s history, 
politicians, academics, and even the judiciary itself, have come to 
regard constitutional law as little more than a political spoil. 
This paper will explore the interrelationship between the current 
legal realist climate and the divisive battles over judicial nominations 
now occupying Washington.  Part I of this paper provides the necessary 
background.  I will highlight some recent events that have served to 
inculcate the realist perspective into the current political and legal 
cultures.  I should emphasize, however, that my purpose in this respect 
is only to explain why the realist perspective has achieved such 
dominance; it is not to defend, or attack, the validity of the legal realist 
account.  Nor do I contend that all the current political and legal players 
in the nominations debates would describe themselves as realists. 
Indeed, I suspect many would not.  All sides, however, appear to 
believe that the results in constitutional cases will inevitably turn upon 
the philosophical and political orientation of who is appointed to the 
 6 See id. at 493.  According to Friedman, many legal intellectuals during the mid-twentieth 
century were “quite willing to admit that formalism was dead dry bones.  But they shrank back in 
horror from the ultimate message of the realists (as they read it): that law was only politics or 
economics or personal whim or whatever.”  Id. 
 7 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
 8 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 74-134 (2001) (noting that presidential nominations, including 
judicial appointments, have long been based on these and like factors). 
 9 As Professor Friedman notes, “[a]ll legal scholars and judges and lawyers—are in some 
sense legal realists.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 589. 
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judiciary, and in that sense everyone is at least a practicing realist, even 
if she does not consciously accept the realist theory. 
In Part II, I demonstrate that although the costs in the current 
nomination battles are high, any compromise or reform of the judicial 
nominations process is unlikely to occur in the current climate.  So long 
as compromising over candidates is seen as tantamount to political 
concession over such issues as abortion, religious freedom, gun rights, 
or any other hot button issue, one must be skeptical about whether 
institutional reform is possible.  In Part II, I also address whether 
nominating and debating the merits of judicial candidates on the basis of 
their philosophical or political views should itself be considered a 
positive reform because it brings the ideological orientation issue to the 
fore.10  I contend that, while such an approach may be unavoidable in 
the current political climate, it is nevertheless not beneficial and may 
only serve to worsen the process because realist critiques and reactions 
tend to build upon themselves. 
Finally, in Part III, I argue that the best opportunity to abate the 
current nominations crisis depends on the statesmanship of the key 
political players in the process—specifically the President and the 
majority and minority leaders of the Senate and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  I conclude, however, that one should not hold out much 
hope that such leadership will be forthcoming. 
I. THE RISE OF REALISM
The criticism that a particular constitutional decision is politically 
or ideologically motivated is neither new nor exceptional.11  Marbury v. 
Madison,12 for example, was criticized in its own time as an 
unwarranted power grab by the Federalist judiciary.13  Similarly, in the 
middle 1800s, Scott v. Sanford,14 along with its other travesties, was 
criticized as an overtly political act by a partisan Court.15  And, in the 
early part of the twentieth century, Lochner v. New York16 and its 
progeny were condemned by Justice Holmes and others as improper 
 10 See Robert F. Nagel, Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice: 
Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 858 (1990) (arguing in favor of the Senate’s 
reviewing of the ideology of judicial nominees). 
 11 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millennium: Ideology 
and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003). 
12 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 13 See Charles F. Hobson, Marbury v. Madison and the Revolution of 1800: John Marshall, 
the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis 1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 299-301 
(2003). 
14 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
15 See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 164-78 (1999). 
16 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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attempts to graft the Court majority’s economic theories onto the United 
States Constitution.17 
Also not new is the broader view that all law, and not just a few 
isolated cases, is inherently reflective of the philosophical or political 
views of those empowered to adjudicate.  Legal realism, with its 
powerful critique of common law assumptions, has been around at least 
since the early part of the twentieth century.18  And, the position that 
constitutional interpretation is also intrinsically subject to the political 
or ideological views of judges is also not a new phenomenon.19 
Recently, however, the notion that legal interpretation depends on 
the philosophical inclination of those assigned to decide cases has 
achieved greater resonance.  Although legal and political observers may 
have long since acceded to the realization that constitutional law is at 
least partially dependent on the identity of judges,20 legal realism is no 
longer an abstraction.  Rather, it is a visible component of the current 
legal and political cultures.21 
Undoubtedly, the catalyst for the ascension of the realist perception 
in contemporary political and legal culture is Roe v. Wade.22  While 
some decisions of the earlier Warren Court had also triggered claims of 
judicial overreaching,23 the impact of Roe in particular can not be 
overstated.  For many, the belief that the case represented anything 
17 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 18 Prominent early realists included such legal luminaries as Karl N. Llewellyn, Thurman 
Arnold, and Jerome Frank.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 490-94.  For a compelling account of the 
rise of legal realism that places the school’s ascendance within the context of the intellectual 
milieu of the period, see EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMORACTIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973). 
19 Charles L. Black Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 
YALE L.J. 657, 660 (1970); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW 
THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 92 (1985). 
 20 Many scholars argue that, at least to some extent, judicial ideology and political factors, 
such as the constituency from which the nominee is drawn, have long impacted the process by 
which the President and the Senate select and evaluate candidates for federal judicial 
appointments.  See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 19; GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 74-77.  But see 
David J. Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 900 (1990) (arguing that while political factors had clearly motivated the Senate since the 
earliest days of the republic, consideration of the judicial ideology of the individual nominee did 
not affect the confirmations process until the twentieth century). 
 21 See Carol M. Rose, Judicial Selection and the Mask of Non-Partisanship, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 929 (1990) (arguing that although disputes over ideology may have been behind earlier 
nominations battles, those battles were not explicitly waged on ideological grounds).  According 
to Rose the realist vision was unmasked during the Bork nomination.  “What seems to have 
distinguished the Bork nomination,” Rose writes, “is that, in this one instance, the figleaf or mask 
fell . . . in this case, the genie was out of the bottle.”  Id. at 929.  For more discussion on the effect 
of the Bork nomination on the rise of realism (and vice versa) see infra notes 26-27 and 
accompanying text. 
22 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 23 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 133-37 (1987); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (1962). 
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more than the political inclinations of seven members of the Supreme 
Court was too hard to accept.  The decision struck down the abortion 
laws of all fifty states, relied on a theory of privacy that had an unclear 
constitutional pedigree, and announced a three trimester framework for 
adjudging abortion rights that, to many onlookers, looked more like a 
statute than the product of legal reasoning.  Indeed, even some pro-
choice advocates found the decision difficult to fit into a coherent legal 
theory.24  In any case, Roe became a rallying cry against a Court 
perceived to be overtaken by the political ideologies of its members and 
a target for a political strategy that would lead to the appointment of 
judges who would overturn the decision. 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Roe was a 
galvanizing force only for anti-abortion advocates.  The very fragility of 
the decision, ironically enough, also heightened the awareness of its 
supporters that constitutional decision-making is susceptible to political 
or ideological forces.  After Roe, pro-choice advocates would be on 
high alert for any changes to the judiciary that might threaten Roe’s 
existence. 
Roe thus became the subtext in the next major event in the rise of 
legal realism: President Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork to the 
United States Supreme Court.  During the nomination hearings, Bork’s 
opponents aggressively maintained that if he were chosen, he would 
inevitably reach certain decisions based upon his pre-conceived 
constitutional philosophy.  They claimed, for example, that confirming 
Bork would result in the loss of a woman’s right to choose, the 
evisceration of anti-discrimination safeguards, and a host of other 
controversial rulings on important constitutional issues.25  The strategy, 
of course, proved successful26 and the Bork nomination was defeated. 
But the aftereffects of the Bork nomination battle would extend beyond 
the nomination itself.  Both sides learned that equating a nominee’s 
judicial philosophy with particular results could be an effective tool in 
opposing judicial candidates.  From Bork onward, there would be a 
premium in tying a judicial candidate to a set of specific positions. 
Thus, for politicians at least, the confirmation process came to be 
perceived, not as simply confirming a judge, but as supporting (or 
 24 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 923 (1973). 
 25 See, e.g., NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE
BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 71-105 (1998); GEORGE WATSON 
& JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 
39-40 (1995).
26 Bork himself did little to disavow his opponents of the accuracy of their assertions.  See,
e.g., Judith Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 889, 893 (1990)
(claiming that Bork’s testimony failed to rebut the notion that he showed little compassion for
those who appeared before him in court).
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opposing) a set of controversial results. 
At roughly the same time liberals were attacking Bork, 
conservatives were preparing an attack of their own.  As Dawn Johnsen 
has documented, the Reagan Justice Department prepared a series of 
memoranda during the 1980s calling for constitutional results to be 
effectuated, in major part, through the selection of federal judges.27  
Specific areas of constitutional law were identified as needing a 
substantial overhaul, and the selection of judges of corresponding 
values and philosophies was deemed the way to get there.  In the words 
of the Justice Department memorandum, “‘[t]here are few factors that 
are more critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more 
often overlooked, than the values and philosophies of the men and 
women who populate the third co-equal branch of the national 
government—the federal judiciary.’”28 As outlined in the Justice 
Department documents, the political strategy was clear.  Republican 
administrations should use the nominations process to achieve 
conservative results.  Similarly, during Democratic administrations, 
Congressional Republicans should oppose Democratic nominees when 
their views and philosophies appeared inconsistent with conservative 
positions. 
Bush v. Gore29 was the next important step in solidifying realism’s 
dominance.  In both the Republican attack on the Florida Supreme 
Court decision and the Democratic attack on the judgment of the United 
States Supreme Court, judicial actions were described and denounced as 
mere partisan action and not judicial interpretation.  The merits of legal 
claims in the case were almost besides the point as the press and 
politicians paid more attention to the partisan leanings of the judges 
involved in the case than to the legal principles at issue.  The judges 
themselves, meanwhile, did little to dispel the criticism as, more often 
than not, the judicial players in the case acted more in line with political 
expectations than with what might be expected from their previous legal 
positions.30 
 27 Dawn Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: 
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003). 
 28 Id. at 397 (citing OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTIC, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION v. (1988)). 
29 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 30 Only Justice Stevens (nominated by Republican President Gerald R. Ford) and Justice 
Souter (nominated by Republican President George H.W. Bush) sanctioned a result in the case 
that would have resulted in a President of a party different from than the party whom nominated 
them.  See also Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 325, 372-73 (2001) (noting that the Bush v. Gore majority’s ruling on federalism was 
inconsistent with the positions that the Justices in the majority had expressed in other cases); 
Richard Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV 377, 390-91 (2001) (noting that the majority’s expansive views of equal protections
were inconsistent with the more narrow views of equal protection that the Justices in the majority
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The realist account of Bush v. Gore, of course, was only magnified 
by the fact that the case took place against the backdrop of one of the 
most dramatic episodes in American political history.  But the lesson of 
the case was perhaps most compelling for the nation’s political actors. 
Politicians learned that not only might the interpretation of 
constitutional law depend upon the identity of the judges deciding the 
cases, but the keys to the Oval Office could depend on the identity of 
those judges as well.  Bush v. Gore thus increased exponentially in the 
minds of the political actors the stakes inherent in judicial 
nominations.31 
The ultimate triumph of realism, however, came not with the bang 
of Bush v. Gore, but with a whimper32 in the relatively unheralded case 
of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.33  In White, the Court 
reviewed a First Amendment challenge to a canon of judicial conduct 
that prohibited a candidate for judicial office from announcing his or her 
views on disputed legal or political issues.  Under Minnesota’s judicial 
canon, it would be unethical, for example, for a candidate to declare he 
was pro-choice or pro-life while campaigning for judicial office. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found that the judicial canon 
restricted speech that is “‘at the core of our First Amendment 
freedoms’—speech about the qualifications of candidates for public 
office.”34  Accordingly, the provision was subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny by the Court in its constitutional review—a heightened review 
that, according to the Court’s majority, the judicial canon did not 
survive. 
From a First Amendment perspective, White was not surprising. 
The Court has long indicated that the First Amendment has its “fullest 
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for 
political office,”35 and White may simply be understood as a 
straightforward application of this principle.  What was surprising about 
had taken in other cases); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001) (noting that the majority’s finding that the case was justiciable was 
inconsistent with conservative precedents). 
 31 Bush v. Gore, however, added a new wrinkle to the Realist understanding.  Because, as we 
have discussed, the Justices’ decisions in the case do not obviously comport with their particular 
judicial philosophies, the case also suggests that judicial decision-making could depend on 
“motivated reasoning” dictated by purely partisan, non-ideological concerns.  See infra note 64. 
 32 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men (1925), in T.S. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 
1909-1950, 56 (1952). 
33 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
34 Id. at 774 (citations omitted). 
35 As stated in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) (internal citations 
omitted): 
And if it be conceded that the First Amendment was fashioned to assure the unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people, then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest 
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. 
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White, however, was the ease with which the Court adopted an extreme 
realist perspective in reaching its decision.  Minnesota had defended the 
judicial canon by arguing that it was intended to promote judicial 
impartiality.  The Court, however, found that impartiality meant only a 
“lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.”36  An 
impartial judge was not one without a particular opinion that 
predisposes him to vote in a particular way in a particular case; instead 
impartiality meant only that a judge is not biased against a particular 
party to a particular proceeding.  Under this interpretation of 
impartiality, a judicial candidate who expressed his “commitment” to 
rule a particular way on an issue because of an ideological 
predisposition would still be considered impartial.  As Justice Scalia 
explained, “when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the 
judge (as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the 
opposite stand is likely to lose.  But not because of any bias against that 
party, or favoritism toward the other party.  Any party taking that 
position is just as likely to lose.  The judge is applying the law (as he 
sees it) evenhandedly.”37 
Indeed, the Court went on to explain that eliminating 
preconceptions is unattainable, even if it is considered desirable: 
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not 
have preconceptions about the law.  As then-Justice Rehnquist 
observed of our own Court: “Since most Justices come to this bench 
no earlier than their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not 
by that time formulated at least some tentative notions that would 
influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the 
Constitution and their interaction with one another.  It would be not 
merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not at least given 
opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous legal careers.” 
Indeed, even if it were possible to select judges who did not have 
preconceived views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to 
do so.  “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court 
was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication 
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” . . . And 
since avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither 
possible nor desirable, pretending otherwise by attempting to 
preserve the “appearance” of that type of impartiality can hardly be a 
compelling state interest either.38 
The affirmation of legal realism in White could not be clearer. 
Judges will decide cases based, at least in part, on their political 
ideology.  The state, accordingly, can not claim that it is improper for a 
candidate to announce’ her personal views because those views are part 
36 White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
37 Id. at 776 (italics omitted). 
38 Id. at 777-78 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U. S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion)). 
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of what sets her apart from other candidates.39  Contrast this result, 
however, against a legal background in which law is understood as 
objective.  If law were objective, judges should reach (or at least strive 
to reach) the same results regardless of personal ideology.  Accordingly, 
a state could consider it unethical (or at least misguided) for candidates 
to claim that their election should lead to different results than the 
election of others.40  White, however, starts with the realist notion of 
non-objectivity as a given.  It assumes, for example, that pro-choice or 
pro-life judges will decide cases in accord with their views on abortion 
and that the results in abortion cases thus may very well depend on the 
particular views of whichever judge hears the case.  To the Court in 
White, constitutional law goes to election winners. 
II. JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION IN AN AGE OF REALISM
With the framework of legal realism in place, it is not difficult to 
see how the judicial nominations process has devolved to its current 
state.  If constitutional results are seen as nothing more than the 
products of pre-existing individual predilections, then the support or 
opposition of a particular candidate really amounts to no more (or less) 
than lending support or opposition to a set of results that the particular 
candidate would be expected to reach.  In that sense, a judicial 
nomination is the functional equivalent of a complex piece of 
legislation. 
Under this view, any president is justified, as the Reagan Justice 
Department memo suggests, in intentionally attempting to appoint 
judges to the Court who will further his agenda.  In fact, the nomination 
of a particular candidate can be seen as akin to proposing legislation. 
The nomination of a Susan Smith, for example, is thus the functional 
equivalent of sponsoring something like a “Susan Smith Act”—fully 
equipped with all the qualifications, provisos, and intricacies of 
complex legislation.  If, for example, Smith is pro-choice, pro-gun 
rights, pro-federalism, anti-capital punishment, and anti-school prayer, 
and the President on balance supports those positions, she becomes a 
logical choice for nomination.  Or, if Smith has an announced judicial 
ideology that the President believes will lead her to reach desirable 
 39 As Professor Chemerinsky notes: “[a]ll judges come on to the bench with views about 
important issues,” to which they will likely adhere even if they have not been expressed during 
the electoral campaign.  Erwin Chemerinksy, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates 
are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 744 (2002). 
 40 A candidate in such an objective world could, of course, make the non-ideological claim 
that her training and experience would better enable her to reach correct decisions than her 
opponent.  Thus, not surprisingly, such assertions by a candidate about personal qualifications 
were fully permitted under Minnesota’s judicial ethics laws. 
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results in certain cases, he might appoint her even if her positions on 
specific issues have not been explicitly identified. 
At the same time, the Senators reviewing a judicial nomination 
might be expected to engage in a similar calculus.  If Smith is pro-
choice, pro-gun rights, pro-federalism, anti-capital punishment, and 
anti-school prayer, a Senator should evaluate his support for her 
nomination much as he would evaluate whether to support an 
appropriation bill that had pro-choice, pro-gun rights, pro-federalism, 
anti-capital punishment, and anti-school prayer elements.  Indeed, this 
was exactly Senator Schumer’s point when he asserted the Senate 
should consider a judicial nominee’s ideology as part of the 
confirmation process.41 
True, the science of nominating or opposing judicial nominees in 
order to accomplish specific results is not exact.  A judge may decide 
not to vote on legal issues in the manner expected by her supporters or 
feared by her opponents.42  Additionally, the ideologies of judges who 
serve long periods on the bench may change over time.43  But then 
again, legislation does not always turn out the way one expects either.44 
What, then, is problematic with either a president’s attempting to 
nominate judicial candidates on ideological grounds or a Senator’s 
efforts to oppose a candidate for ideological reasons?  Indeed, if one of 
the benefits of the Court’s decision in White is to promote an informed 
electorate by allowing state judicial candidates to tell voters how they 
would approach sensitive cases, why is there not equal benefit to 
requiring federal judicial nominees to identify their positions so the 
Senate has the benefit of informed decision-making?45 Is transparency 
41 Schumer, supra note 1. 
 42 See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 659 (2004)  
43 For example, see Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1, for an account of the changes Harry A. Blackmun underwent during 
his twenty-four year tenure on the Court. 
 44 See, e. g., William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 335 (2000) (noting that campaign finance regulation, for example, often results in 
unintended consequences). 
 45 Interestingly, Justice Scalia, who wrote the White opinion, did not feel that he should be 
forthcoming about his political or ideological views during his own confirmation.  Nomination of 
Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 37 (1986): 
Let us assume that I have people arguing before me to do it or not to do it. I think it is 
quite a thing to be arguing to somebody who you know has made a representation in 
the course of his confirmation hearings, and that is, by way of condition to his being 
confirmed, that he will do this or do that. I think I would be in a very bad position to 
adjudicate the case without being accused of having a less than impartial view of the 
matter. 
Notably, Justice Scalia’s reluctance to share his political or ideological views during confirmation 
has been shared by his colleagues.  See Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 119 (1994); Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice 
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not desirable? 
Despite the allure of this reasoning, however, problems abound 
with an appointments process that places such an emphasis on ideology. 
First, the process exacts a considerable toll on nominees.  A candidate’s 
writings are scoured, her passages are taken out of context, and her 
positions are taken to the extreme.46  The result of all this is that, at the 
end of the process, a candidate’s views are more likely to be distorted 
beyond recognition rather than fairly represented. 
Second, an overtly ideological appointments process may 
inherently exclude some of the most able judicial candidates because it 
rewards those who do not have a paper trail.47  Candidates who have 
written extensively, particularly on hot button issues, are easy targets 
for ideological opponents.  The views of candidates with no written 
record, however, are less easy to discern, and opposition is accordingly 
less easy to galvanize.  Nor can well-published candidates avoid 
controversy if their writings are nuanced and not easily categorized as 
belonging to one camp or another.  The heavy-handed nature of 
confirmation hearings leaves little room for the exposition of complex 
ideas. 
Third, an appointments process ensconced in ideology is intensely 
polarizing.48  Every vote on every judicial nominee becomes as heated 
as any vote on hot button issues because the decision over whether to 
confirm the judicial candidate is perceived as, in effect, a vote on those 
issues.  The judicial appointments process thus becomes essentially a 
constant stream of factious votes.49  The resulting divisiveness and 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 52 (1993); Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 180-81 (1991); Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 194 
(1990). 
 46 Arguably, of course, this type of review is preferable to a process focused on discovering 
personal scandal.  Unfortunately, however, candidate review is not an “either or” proposition. 
Ideological review only adds to the already extant personal investigation. 
 47 See also Lloyd N. Cutler, Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of Supreme Court 
Justice: The Limits of Advice and Consent, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 876, 878 (1990), for the view that 
this process could also result in the loss of “Justices who formulate broader and more creative 
statements than the particular case requires.” 
 48 Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005). 
 49 Polarization, moreover, only worsens when, as now, one side makes clear its intention to 
use the appointments process to accomplish ideological results.  See Steven G. Calabresi, Advice 
to the Next Conservative President of the United States, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 376-
78 (2001) (arguing that a conservative president should be uncompromising in nominating judges 
whom he believes will tow the conservative line).  In those circumstances, opposition hardens and 
both sides may use all weapons at their disposal to assure that the other side’s ideological agenda 
is not accomplished.  Thus, currently we have seen the Democrats resort to the filibuster in their 
opposition to Bush nominees while Republicans have utilized both recess nominations and all-
night confirmation sessions to attempt to see their nominations through.  See, e.g., Senate 
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politicization is inevitable.50 
This polarization, moreover, tends to breed on itself.  The natural 
reaction of a political party that believes that the other side is attempting 
to effectuate constitutional change by nominating particular judges is to 
fight those nominations when it is out of power, and to nominate judges 
who will accomplish constitutional change to their benefit (and undo the 
effects of the previous Administration’s nominees) when it is in 
power.51  There is little room for compromise under these 
circumstances.  Neither party can be expected to engage in unilateral 
disarmament when the stakes are so high. 
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, an ideologically-driven 
appointments process legitimizes ideological judicial decision-making. 
The power of the realist critique rests solely in its descriptive account of 
judicial decision-making.  It contends that judges ultimately can not 
fully escape their preconceived values, or what Oliver Wendell Homes 
once called their “can’t helps.”52  Legal realism, however, is less 
powerful as a prescriptive model for what law should be—at least if we 
are to believe that there should be a difference between judicial and 
legislative decision-making.53  Why should unelected judges be 
empowered to decide some of the most important issues of the day if 
they are no more than political actors themselves? 
The problem with wholly succumbing to the realist vision in the 
judicial nominations context is that it completely abandons the notion 
that judges should at least aspire to decide cases on grounds other than 
their own pre-existing philosophical or political dispositions.  After all, 
it is one thing to descriptively maintain that judges are influenced by 
their existing political views, but quite another to prescriptively claim 
that judges should be unconstrained in applying their political views to 
Democrats Block Vote on Judge, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 2003, at C24; Karen MacPherson, They 
Could Have Danced All Night; They Talked Instead, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 2003, at A1. 
 50 As Ward Farnsworth has warned, when a side attempts to uncompromisingly use the 
nominations process to accomplish ideological results “[t]hings are said that one regrets; 
relationships are injured and reputations soiled; the impression that the process has become 
undignified and unpleasant—politicized—naturally takes hold.”  See Farnsworth, supra note 48 
(noting the divisiveness inherent in the uncompromising strategy of judicial nominations 
advocated by Calabresi).  But see also, Henry Paul Monaghan, Essays on the Supreme Court 
Appointment Process: The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 
1207 (1988), for the view that “we are better off recognizing a virtually unlimited political license 
in the Senate not to confirm nominees.” 
 51 Senator Schumer’s call to review the ideology of judicial nominations was based in part 
upon his concern that President Bush was appointing judges expressly based on their ideology. 
Schumer, supra note 1. 
 52 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES 107 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). 
 53 The virtue of a judge’s efforts to minimize as much as possible the influence of her 
political views in deciding cases is referred to by Lawrence Solum in a series of important articles 
as judicial “character.”  See Solum, supra note 42; see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and 
Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988). 
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existing cases.54  As Martin Redish explains, recognizing the validity of 
the realist insight does not mean that one has to accept that all law is 
nothing more than simple political preferences.55  The ascendance of the 
legal realism model, however, suggests exactly that, and in the process 
effectively encourages confirmed judges to vote pursuant to their 
political beliefs. 
Consider, for example, a judge who testifies in her confirmation 
proceedings that she believes Lochner v. New York is good law.  If she 
is confirmed after being subject to ideological scrutiny, she might 
rightfully take from her confirmation that she is free to decide cases 
consistent with her Lochner views regardless of judicial precedent.  She 
was confirmed as a pro-Lochner judge, and the expectations of her 
supporters, and her detractors, is that she will carry this view to the 
bench.  An overtly ideological appointments process, then, effectively 
licenses judges to act in accord with their political leanings.  The result 
is a system of unbridled legal realism wherein no judge may believe that 
she has any obligation other than to act on her political inclinations. 
III. THE BARRIERS TO REFORM
Despite the political polarization and the harms to judicial 
institutions that have resulted from the current ideological battles over 
judicial nominations, I suspect there is no relief in sight.  The only 
possible reform, it seems to me, is for the key players, such as the 
President and the minority and majority leaders of the Senate and 
Senate Judiciary Committee, to provide leadership and agree to 
minimize the role of ideology in the appointments process in favor of a 
system that chooses judges based upon an appraisal for excellence in 
judicial craft removed from political inclination.56  Such an approach 
presumably would be similar to the one proposed by Lawrence Solum 
in this Symposium when he advocates that  judges should be appointed 
 54 Not all legal scholars have conceded that this is necessarily a bad way to interpret the 
Constitution.  Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who would not likely have gone so far as to condone 
this approach if used by his contemporaries, wrote that Chief Justice John Marshall “gave to the 
constitution of the United States the impress of his own mind; and the form of our constitutional 
law is what it is, because he molded it while it was still plastic and malleable in the fire of his 
own intense convictions.”  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
169-70 (1921).
55 Martin H. Redish, Legal Realism and the Confirmation Process: A Comment on Professor
Nagel’s Thesis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 886, 887 (1990). 
56 For an attempt to quantify judicial excellence, see Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosing 
the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance,  78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 101 (2004). 
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on the basis of their judicial “character.”57 
The idea is admirable, but I am afraid it will not work.  We are not 
in a time of political statesmanship in any area.  And, it is particularly 
unlikely that a regime of political statesmanship will take hold in the 
debates over judicial selection in the foreseeable future.  Let me suggest 
a few reasons for this pessimism. 
First, the stakes are simply too high.  The issues subject to judicial 
review are too important for a political party with the ability to 
effectuate policy goals by nominating judges favorable to their agenda 
to willingly cede its power.  Abortion rights, affirmative action, gay 
rights, and political redistricting, for example, are issues at the top of 
both parties’ agendas.  They are also matters subject to judicial review 
and resolution.  Why should the nominating party refuse to use its 
judicial nominations powers to affect judicial decisions on such matters 
when those issues are so important to its constituency?58 
True, the nominating party may be forced to compromise if the 
opposing party has political strength sufficient to force concessions, but 
the party in power has no more incentive to yield its power in the 
appointments process than it has to support legislation that is 
inconsistent with its agenda.  At the same time, the opposing party has 
no incentive, other than that dictated by the political balance of power, 
to abandon any of its weapons or prerogatives in fighting the other 
party’s efforts.  To neither side, will the promotion of an idealistic 
vision of judging likely be as high a priority as the achievement of 
specific constitutional results. 
Second, statesmanship is particularly unlikely to take hold of the 
nominations process when the Supreme Court is as closely divided as it 
is over key issues.  The Court’s steady stream of 5-4 decisions serves as 
a constant reminder of the importance of having sympathetic Justices on 
the bench.  Both sides see themselves as either one vote away from 
losing an important constitutional principle or as one vote away from 
achieving a major constitutional victory.  Moreover, even in the absence 
 57 Solum, supra note 42.  By judicial character, Solum means judges who will decide cases 
based upon a formalist’s rather than a realist approach to legal issues. 
 58 Indeed, as Robert Nagel, writing in 1990, pointed out, it is the fact that the Warren Court 
and later the Burger Court began to routinely exercise judicial power in these areas that has made 
compromise on judicial nominees all the more difficult.  Nagel, supra note 10.  Once the Court 
announced that the resolution of important policy matters such as gender rights, campaign 
finance, parochial aid, abortion and other matters were within its dominion, the stakes for 
controlling the judiciary grew correspondingly higher.  Id. at 860.  In this respect, the actions of 
the Rehnquist Court have only added to the strength of Nagel’s insight.  By using judicial power 
to invalidate a wide range of legislative initiatives including such matters as affirmative action, 
see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 
(2001), presidential powers, see Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), and civil rights 
legislation, see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000), the Rehnquist Court has only added to the political importance of controlling the federal 
courts. 
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of close votes, political efforts to change the Court may be expected 
when one side sees the Court as opposed to its particular agenda and 
therefore in need of reform.  The problem now, however, is that both 
conservatives and liberals view the Court as hostile territory.59  Neither 
side is therefore likely to be satisfied until a Court majority has been 
solidified in its favor—an event that for neither side is likely to come 
soon. 
Third, even if both sides were to agree to a course of 
statesmanship, there is considerable doubt as to whether political 
consensus could be reached over candidates based upon qualifications 
such as excellence or character.  The issue, after all, is not whether the 
candidate is herself committed to mastering the judicial craft removed 
from political influence; the question for political calculation is how the 
candidate’s record is perceived.  And, in that sense, the hold of the 
realist critique may be unshakeable.  No matter how committed a 
judicial candidate is to not letting her political views affect her legal 
judgment, she will be seen as a political actor by those who disagree 
with her on key issues. 
For example, pro-life or pro-choice proponents are unlikely to 
believe that a judge who rules against them on abortion rights will have 
made her decision based upon pure legal reasoning.  Those who 
disagree with the ruling may of course concede that the judge herself 
believes that her pro-choice or a pro-life ruling is based upon a 
politically neutral legal judgment.  But, to her opponents, the judge’s 
intent is not the point.  To them, the judge could only have reached the 
result she did through the influence of her political views whether or not 
she consciously recognized that influence.  In a realist world, 
unfortunately, legal principle is only in the eye of the beholder.  It has 
no independent status. 
To further drive this point home, let us return for a moment to 
Bush v. Gore.  One of the more intriguing aspects of the case is that 
academic criticism of the opinion tended to break down along partisan 
lines.  Generally, those who supported then-Governor Bush found the 
Court’s opinion to be correct or at least intellectually defensible,60 while 
those who favored then-Vice President Gore saw the decision as wrong, 
 59 Critics from the left, to use but one example, have harshly condemned the Court for 
purportedly imposing an anti-civil rights agenda.  See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-
antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1141-42 (2002).  Meanwhile, again using just 
one example, voices on the right have assailed the Court for ostensibly furthering a gay rights 
agenda.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The 
complete list of attacks on the Court from both the left and the right are too numerous to be 
catalogued. 
 60 See, e.g., Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH V. 
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 1 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) [hereinafter QUESTION OF 
LEGITIMACY]. 
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if not entirely lawless.61  This was so, interestingly enough, even though 
the opinion’s stance on such issues as equal protection, federalism, 
political question, and standing was more in line with the judicial 
philosophy of those who might be expected to support candidate Gore, 
while the dissents’ views advocating narrower interpretations of equal 
protection, more limited views of federalism, and less expansive notions 
of federal judicial power were more in accord with the jurisprudence of 
those who might otherwise be expected to support candidate Bush.62 
Some might suggest that the academic reaction to Bush v. Gore 
simply proves that the ivory tower of academia is no more removed 
from cynical partisanship than are the halls of Congress.63  There is, 
however, a less harsh, albeit more troubling explanation.  As Cass 
Sunstein explains, the players in Bush v. Gore, both on and off the 
Court, may be led more by “motivated reasoning” than by explicit 
partisan purpose.64  That is, the academics’ political leanings affected 
their analysis more subconsciously than deliberately.  But, in many 
ways that conclusion is more disturbing than would be the conclusion 
that the academics’ views were affected by conscious partisan 
calculation.  After all, one can attempt to overcome conscious bias in 
order to achieve an objective stance.  The conclusion that subconscious 
motivation affects legal judgment, however, makes objectivity all but 
impossible. 
If motivated reasoning explains not only the academic response to 
Bush v. Gore but also the Court’s decision itself, it adds yet another nail 
in the coffin of statesmanship.  Why should the politicians involved in 
the nominations battles follow a course of choosing judges based upon 
an ideal of judicial excellence or character when that ideal may be 
unattainable?  The safer course is to continue to fight nomination battles 
on overtly ideological grounds that more predictably reflect the 
politicians’ political agendas. 
 61 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Constitution Enact the Republican Party Platform?  
in BUSH V. GORE, supra note 60.  See also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in 
THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001) for the view that Bush v. Gore is 
the latest in a series of cases, including Dred Scott, to intrude into the realm of political decision 
making.  But see, also, Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 
60, for the more extreme position that Bush v. Gore goes further than Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1857), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), or Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 
(1973), by completely eschewing any pretense of enunciating “enduring principles rooted in the 
nation’s historic constitutional commitments.” 
62 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 63 Indeed, some have argued that with respect to partisan decision-making, Bush v. Gore 
suggests that the Supreme Court is no different than the halls of Congress. 
64 See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 4-
5 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
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CONCLUSION 
The insights of Legal Realism have left an indelible mark upon the 
landscape of American law. Whatever the theoretical merits of the 
realist vision, the practical ramifications of the notion that judges are 
motivated by their own ideological predilections have drawn the judicial 
nominations process into a downward spiral.  Believing they can 
achieve substantive policy aims by selecting or rejecting judicial 
candidates who might promote or frustrate their preferred constitutional 
vision, politicians have proven increasingly eager to evaluate 
prospective judges on ideological grounds. 
This pattern is troubling.  It fosters a more divisive and less 
productive political and legal culture, and it places the presidential and 
congressional imprimatur on partisan judicial decision-making.  The 
ideal solution to the problem would be for the President and Senate 
leaders to make statesmanlike efforts to reduce the role of ideology in 
the nominations process.  Such a scenario, however, is unlikely.  The 
current climate of cynicism toward the prospect of judicial impartiality 
and the corresponding pitch battles that attend judicial nominations are 
unlikely to end so long as politicians, academics, and judges themselves 
accept the notion that constitutional law amounts to little more than 
political spoils. 
